Abstract:
This article examines the early stage of the Northern Ireland conflict from the beginning of the ethno-nationalist conflict called the Troubles of 1969 to the beginning of the `peace process' through the Downing Street Declaration of 1993 by focusing on a process of political, non-violent resolution efforts of political agents, which affected the route of the conflict. It utilises conflict resolution approaches to determine the variables with regards to the perceptions, positions, and decisions of conflicting parties, which provide an understanding of their role in peacemaking during the high-intensity conflict. Particularly, it offers three major aspects for analysis: inter-party collaboration, popular support, and interchangeability between armed and political struggle. It uses rich data from archival documents to analyse the influence of early peace efforts to de-escalate the conflict and establish foundations for peace prior to official negotiations. It argues that peace efforts do not consist of official negotiations in the 1990s. The article finds that they had been initiated long before multilateral negotiations through political conferences, direct and indirect dialogues between major political parties in Northern Ireland, and the British and Irish governments. However, the reluctance of political agents towards peace prevented making progress towards peace.
